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Abstract 
The inclusion of human feelings and emotions presents a serious problem in the 
design research field. Traditional approaches, focusing on emotions, are problematic 
for design theory building and do not align with recent findings about human psycho-
neuro-physiological functioning. This paper describes research aimed at improving 
the ways feelings and emotions are represented in theories about design cognition. 
The paper focuses on recent research findings of Antonio Damasio and colleagues and 
applies them to theory making about designing and the ways designed artefacts are 
perceived and used.  
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1. Introduction  
A serious problem in the design research field involves the inclusion of human 
feelings, affects and emotions (see, for example, Love, 2003, 2001; Sloman, 2001). 
There is increasing interest in the role of emotion in designing (see, for example, 
refs). This paper takes the position that focusing solely on emotions is problematic for 
including human issues in design theory building and that current emotion-based 
approaches are problematic because they unhelpfully conflate several important 
conceptual and functional issues about human internal functioning that are needed to 
build a satisfactory understanding of the human activities involved in designing. Also, 
they do not take into account, or align with, recent findings about human psycho-
neuro-cognitive functioning. A parallel in the world of machines, is that current 
approaches to understanding design cognition via emotions is like trying to 
understand how an engine works by focusing on the colour of the car and refusing to 
have anything to do with engineering theory.  
The paper focuses on recent research analyses by Portuguese scientist Antonio 
Damasio and colleagues in the field of neuro-cognition and applies them to theory 
making about designing and the ways designed artefacts are perceived and used. It 
draws on research in which key characteristics of Damasio's analyses and research 
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findings as described in Damasio (1999; 1994) were mapped onto design theories 
about cognition. Three areas of design theory strongly impacted by human feelings 
and affect were identified, and Damasio's approach to the same issues was compared 
and contrasted with the existing design research literature. The findings of this 
comparative analysis suggested the need for a fundamental review of key areas of 
design theory, in particular a radical overhaul of the central theory areas of design 
cognition, user interaction and design collaboration.  
The document has five parts. The second section briefly reviews some background 
issues. The third part outlines some key concepts from Damasio's analyses focusing 
particularly on those issues that obviously connect with building more comprehensive 
design theories. Part four draws out the implications of Damasio's work for design 
theory and design research. The final section summarises the paper and points to 
future directions in design research in relation to design, sense and sense making. 
2. Background  
All design theories presume theories about human cognitive processes because 
designing is an essentially human activity, and the purposes of actualized designed 
outcomes are tied to human utilization and values. Human feeling, emotional, 
automatic and non-rational processes have been mainly included in design theories by 
being subsumed within Cognitive Science models of design cognition (see, for 
example, Franklin, 1999; ISRE, 2001; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Susac, 1998) 
or nebulously connected to theories about the way designers and users experience, 
e.g. objects and thoughts (e.g. Design and Emotion Society, 2003; Hummels, 
Djajadiningrat, & Overbeeke, 2001). In essence, these approaches have included 
human non-rational issues via loosely-conceived and relatively superficial 
conceptualisations of emotions - even compared to much earlier work by, e.g. Dewey 
(1895; Dewey, 1895). This paper explores how design theories might take into 
account the recent work of Damasio and colleagues that builds theories of feeling, 
affect, thinking and creativity directly on an understanding of the physiological 
processes involved. Damasio's focus on internal human functioning contrasts with the 
extensive literature in design research that explains designing in terms of 
psychological, behavioural, informatic and emotion theories. His analyses of the 
neurological data suggest that there is significant epistemological benefit from 
problematising the relationships between feeling, feelings, emotions, consciousness 
and human homeostatic physiological processes that are precedent to, and underpin, 
rational thinking. Damasio's analyses are based on neurological research by himself 
and colleagues at the Dept of Neurology, University of Iowa. In most cases, theories 
and their confirmation come from observing pathology of human neurological and 
physiological systems mainly via brain lesions. He points out (p14) that this type of 
work has recently seen significant change of pace because new technical research 
method such as fMRI and PET techniques shorten time to gaining insights relating to 
brain lesions. Previously the time for correlation between behavioural and 
neurological data was significant because, in most cases, neurological data could only 
be gathered via autopsy at the time of a subject's death. Now fMRI techniques enable 
lesion-based research to progress with living subjects. Damasio's analyses bring 
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together philosophy, psychology and biology (as elements of the new field of 
cognitive neuroscience) particularly as they relate to the phenomena of mind, 
consciousness and behaviours. He draws attention to the importance of these links 
(P13) in terms of triangulating and validating analyses. He notes that humans are 
aware of the inter-correlatedness of the phenomena of mind, consciousness within 
mind, and behaviour through self-analysis, and because of human enthusiasm for 
analysing others. Physiologically, these phenomena are actualised by and therefore 
closely correlate with functions of living organisms, specifically, in humans with the 
functions of the brain. This triangulation is useful in terms of theory making and 
validation.  
The rapid advances in these areas of neurology have lead to new professionals such as 
experimental neuro-anatomists, neuro-physiologists, neuro-pharmacologists and 
neuro-biologists, which supports and extends research in cognitive neuro-science into 
the realms of molecular events and the composition and action of specific genes. 
(P15).  
In short, Damasio's analyses and theories about how people think and feel are 
grounded on substantial understanding of the physiological underpinnings of human 
functioning to the extent that it is possible to deduce e.g. that a particular theory about 
a human process could not apply because the physical substrate for that process does 
not exist. 
3. Damasio's Theories about Feeling, Feelings, Sense 
of Self, Emotions, Consciousness, Human 
Homeostatic Processes, and Imagogenic Thinking  
The following is distilled mainly from Damasio's 1999 book (Damasio, 1999) as this 
contains and extends on the ideas of the 1994 text (Damasio, 1994) with the exception 
of the philosophical issues relating to mind-body duality, reason and Descartes - none 
of which is a focus of this paper. Page numbers in the text refer to Damasio (1999).  
3.1 Separating 'emotion', 'feeling an emotion' and 'sense of oneself 
feeling an emotion'  
Damasio insists (P8) on the importance on biological grounds of distinguishing 
between:  
• An emotion  
• The feeling of that emotion  
• The sense of self feeling that emotion (i.e. knowing that as an individual it is 
'me' that is feeling the emotion.)  
Clinical research has shown that these are phenomena with physiologically distinct 
processes. These issues are conflated and blurred in current design theories. 
3.2 Emotions  
Love, Terence (2003) Design and sense: implications of Damasio's neurological findings for design 
theory, in Proceedings of Science and Technology of Design, Senses and Sensibility in Technology - 




In the above, Damasio uses a technical definition of emotion. Emotion consists of the 
myriad of small changes to an individual's physiology (e.g. blood pressure, muscle 
tone, facial appearance) that can be triggered and executed without an individual 
being aware of it. There is nothing particularly unusual or human about emotion - 
many animals exhibit emotion responses, particularly to changes in their environment 
- e.g. a cat stands hair on end, arches back and spits when threatened (p 35). Some key 
characteristics of emotions (P51):  
• A pattern of complicated collections of chemical and neural responses  
• All emotions have some kind of regulatory role whose role is to assist the 
organism in maintaining life  
• Biologically determined processes depending on innately set brain devices and 
laid down by long evolutionary history, although expression can be modified 
by cultural and learning factors  
• Located in a very restricted set of sub-cortical brain structures that regulate 
and represent body states  
• Emotion brain devices can be engaged automatically  
• Emotions use the body as a theatre (using internal milieu, visceral, vestibular 
and musculo-skeletal systems) and have effects on numerous brain circuits. 
The collection of these changes becomes the basis for the neural patterns that 
in turn become the feelings of an emotion  
Following convention, Damasio divides emotion into different types: the primary 
(universal) emotions consisting of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and 
disgust; background emotions such as well-being, malaise, calm, and tension; and 
secondary (social) emotions such as embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, and pride  
3.3 Feelings  
The feeling of an emotion refers to the generation of a neurological image (image 
refers to a representative neurological pattern) representing within, the human 
organism that state of emotion. This distinguishes the physicality of the emotion, as a 
set of bodily changes, and the separate internal representation of that emotion - the 
feeling. We are not necessarily conscious of either of these phenomena.  
3.4 Sense of self feeling an emotion  
The conscious feeling of an emotion requires an additional step: the sense of oneself 
as an individual (the sense of me) that has that feeling and that emotion. It is perhaps, 
one of Damasio's most important insights that the 'feeling of self' is essential to 
affective processes. This feeling of self, consciousness, and the role both play in 
feelings and emotions is significantly neglected in the literature on affect and affective 
cognition. Damasio draws attention to the importance of understanding the complex 
interdependencies between the mechanisms of consciousness and those of feeling and 
emotions to understand any of their roles in human functioning.  
The above sets the first conceptual distinctions. These are in the realm of conceptual 
tools and distinctions. Of more interest in terms of building coherent theories about 
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design cognition and the ways that users interact with designed artefacts is Damasio's 
description of why and how these processes come about.  
3.5 Emotions, feelings and Relationship with life-regulating processes 
and reason  
Damasio views human evolution ethologically regarding the human as a very 
sophisticated form of organism that has got to its present state by adding to previous 
biological systems and/or reusing them for alternative processes often whilst they are 
simultaneously used for their original functions. A simple organism has emotions 
(changes of physiological state) in response to changes in its environment. How an 
organism responds to their environment is very strongly determined by homeostatic 
processes that maintain the organism's physiological states within a narrow window of 
variability in which the organism is viable (P137). Emotions can be seen as higher-
level components of homeostatic life regulation processes (regulating metabolism, 
simple reflexes, motivation, biology of pleasure and pain etc) that produce 
stereotypically suitable behaviours appropriate to survival (P54). The relative 
relationships are shown in Table 1. Consciousness occurs just above the boundary 
between feelings and high reason.  
High reason 
Complex customized plans of response are 
formulated in conscious reason and may be 
executed as behaviour  
Feelings Sensory patterns signaling pain, pleasure and emotions that may become 'images'  
Emotions Complex stereotyped patterns of response (secondary, primary, and background emotions) 
Basic life 
regulation 
Simple stereotyped patterns of response including 
metabolic regulation, reflexes, the machinery for 
pain and pleasure, drives and motivations  
Table 1: Damasio's Levels of Life Regulation (Damasio, 1999, p. 55 )  
Emotions result from either direct observation of an object or situation external to an 
individual, or from observation of an internally held representation of an object or 
situation via the thought process. Whilst the biological basis of emotions is preset, the 
means of inducing emotions is open to change from an organism's experiences of its 
environment in a learning process that is strongly skewed by the underlying primitive 
processes. Thus emotion responses become 'attached' to perceptions of particular 
objects and situations either observed directly or thought about.  
3.6 Core and Extended Consciousness  
Damasio differentiates between core consciousness as the basic sense of the existence 
of oneself, and extended autobiographical consciousness, the memory that it is a 
particular person with a particular history and memories that is existing and doing 
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things. The differentiation is because there is at least one significant biological 
difference in the ways that these two forms of consciousness are actualized. Further, 
clinical research shows that brain compromised individuals can lose the facility of 
extended consciousness without losing core consciousness but not vice versa. They 
are based on physiologically different processes with the core consciousness using a 
short-term memory and in fact being renewed moment to moment. This contrasts with 
extended autobiographical consciousness, which uses long-term memory to give an 
internal image of an individual with a life history. Extended consciousness is built on 
and depends on core consciousness and emotion. Lack of emotion always means lack 
of consciousness. 
3.7 Core consciousness 
Core consciousness is easier described in terms of what it is not (p. 122). It does not 
depend on working memory, remembering or recalling an image, learning, nor does it 
depend at all on language. In terms of building design theory, Damasio states very 
explicitly that core consciousness 'is not equal to manipulating an image intelligently 
in processes of planning, problem-solving or creativity.' It is a transient phenomenon 
rebuilt moment to moment. Emotion and core consciousness are interrelated. The 
entire range of emotional expression (secondary, primary and background) is not 
functional in individuals who have faulty core consciousness. (This contrasts with 
those with impaired extended consciousness but with unimpaired core consciousness. 
In this case, only secondary (social) emotions are missing which is what might be 
expected as the autobiographical self that underpins these social emoting is absent. 
Core consciousness also has other roles (p125) it 'focuses and enhances attention and 
working memory'; 'favours establishment of memories'; 'is indispensable for the 
normal operations of language', and 'enlarges the scope of the intelligent 
manipulations we call planning, problem-solving and creativity'.  
3.8 Proto-self and homeostatic mechanisms 
Damasio proposes core consciousness depends on an inner sense based on images of a 
feeling. This he suggests is an image of the human internal milieu - the internal state 
of the organism: This proto-self he suggests (p. 154) is ' a coherent collection of 
neural patterns which map, moment by moment, the state of the physical structure of 
the organism in its many dimensions' - over many interconnected brain levels and 
locations intimately connected with regulating the body's state. An important issue is 
that it is not possible to be conscious of the proto-self. It has no ability to perceive, 
contains no knowledge, and language is not part of its structure. It emerges 
continuously and dynamically from the complex states of the body as a distributed 
'reference' - an image of the body state like the feeling in section 3.3.  
3.9 Perceptions of objects  
The perception of an object (either external to the body or internal via thought image) 
results in ' a collection of minor adjustments [to the body] required to continue 
gathering signals about the object as well as emotional responses to several aspects of 
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the object'. That is, observing an object, or thinking about it, results in changes to the 
proto-self.  
3.10 Consciousness  
Damasio suggests that consciousness is the process by which our organisms construct 
a (wordless) message about how our organism (represented by our proto-self) has 
been changed by perception of an object. He suggests core consciousness is a 
moment-by-moment narrative each short phase of which has beginning, middle and 
end. 'The beginning corresponds to the initial state of the organism. The middle is the 
arrival of the object. The end is made up of the reactions that result in the modified 
state of the organism'. Here the focusing and emphasizing aspect of the prototype has 
an important role. Damasio proposes the formal hypothesis that 'core consciousness 
occurs when the brains' representation devices generate an imaged nonverbal account 
of how the organisms own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object, 
and when this process enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it 
saliently in a spatial and temporal context'.  
In short:  
1. Core consciousness depends on interaction between body and object  
2. The body's states are mapped onto the brain as first order neural images 
(proto-self)  
3. The images relating to the object cause changes to the images relating to the 
organism  
4. These changes are re-represented in a second order map of the relationship 
between object and body. This is a map of the transitional multidimensional 
dynamic of change rather than a map of a stationary situation.  
5. These second order maps become mental images in same way as first order 
maps  
6. The body-related nature of organism maps (proto-self) and 2nd order maps 
means that the mental images are feelings.  
3.11 The Autobiographical Self  
The moment by moment representation of core consciousness are facts and as such 
can be committed to memory, be classified and related to other memories of past and 
potential futures. These processes of converting core consciousness to the memories 
that give rise to a sense of autobiographical self and extended consciousness are 
strongly dependent on the focusing and emphasizing aspects of the proto-self 
mechanisms forming a bridge between the transient and relatively stable processes (p. 
173). The relationship between the moment-to-moment neural maps of core 
consciousness and the relatively stable memories that underpin autobiographical self 
and extended consciousness are reflexive but not symmetrical. Bringing to mind the 
stored items from long term or working memories results - obviously - in further core 
consciousness processes that in turn result in further focusing and emphasizing. 
Together these also point to explanations of a broad range of human processes such as 
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learning, acculturation, habituation, conditioning, cognitive fixation and group 
dynamic effects.  
3.12 Feeling feelings  
To recap, emotions are the changes in body states, caused by interaction with objects 
(which include objects represented imagogenically. Feelings are the 1st order neural 
representations of these states. It is only when feelings are associated consciously 
with a sense of self that feelings are felt and perceived. The sequence is (p283):  
1. Engagement with an inducer of emotion, e.g. sight of an object, thought about 
an object. It is not necessary that this is conscious.  
2. Signals from perception processes trigger emotional-induction neural sites 
associated with that type of object  
3. These in turn trigger brain and body sites that result in the whole physiological 
response that is the emotion  
4. First order neural maps (proto-self) are made of changes to body states. 
Feelings emerge.  
5. Neural patterns from emotion-induction sites mapped onto second order neural 
maps along with changes in proto-self that result from emotions. This results 
in an account of the events.  
4. Implications of Damasio's Theories for Design 
Theory and Design Research  
Damasio's work confirms the importance of recent trends towards emphasizing the 
human aspects of design such as emotions, feelings, identity, sense of self, and values 
(see, for example, Design and Emotion Society, 2003; Davis, 2001; Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology -Affective Computing Research Area, 1999; Sloman, 2001, 
1999; Wilson, 1999). Damasio relates his processes, particularly when discussing the 
broader roles of the processes of extended consciousness and autobiographical self, to 
higher-level human activities such as planning and reflection (see, for example, p. 58). 
His theories apply directly to designing, which is essentially a planning process 
(Simon, 1981, p. 129) Damasio's model offers a rich conceptual and theoretical 
backdrop on which to locate models of designing and object use. It offers many 
insights into understanding the internal processes of designing and the ways people 
interact with designed artefacts.  
Applying Damasio's analyses indicates the activity of designing depends totally on the 
consciousness processes and feeling activities that connect the emotion responses 
from experiencing objects and situations to our homeostatic regulation; systems of 
reward and punishment, pain and pleasure, approach and withdrawal etc. Damasio 
shows how, together, consciousness, feeling, and reason enable us to go beyond the 
automatism of emotion responses to be able to undertake these higher order human 
activities of designing, planning, creating and undertaking reflection - in each case 
also with conscience, thus bringing in an ethical dimension (pp. 230-233)  
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The analyses of Damasio (1999) offer causal physical explanation of relationships 
between individuals' conscious and unconscious processes and their bodies' responses 
to real and cognitively held objects. These issues are central to design research, design 
theory and to developing heuristics to improve designing and design management. 
Whilst confirming the importance of the current trend in design research to place 
greater attention on human issues, Damasio's work goes beyond and contradicts 
existing literature in design fields on these issues. Traditionally, theory making about 
human aspects of designing has been grounded in philosophically based conceptual 
speculations about internal human processes relating to feelings and emotions without 
reference to the physicality of the actualisation of these processes. Empirically based 
causal physical explanations such as the analyses of Damasio's provide the basis for 
validating or refuting the earlier speculative correlation-based theories. The change in 
research approach means eventual replacement of correlation-based theories with 
theories that contain empirically identified causally based explanations. This is true 
also of Damasio's earlier (1994) work which challenges the mind-body duality and 
rationalist program of Descartes and others, and again proposes a causally-based 
explanation of the embodied functioning of reason in feeling human organisms.  
Damasio offers causally based explanations of the functioning of three phenomena 
occurring in humans that are central to design practice, design theory making and 
design research:  
• Non-rational activity (emotion, feeling consciousness etc)  
• Rational activity (logic etc)  
• Humans interactions with externally an internally perceived objects  
The three most obvious areas affected by Damasio's work are design cognition, user 
interaction, and design collaboration. The implications for design collaboration 
processes come about because this collaboration requires communication between 
constituents and these communications themselves are objects as defined by Damasio, 
and processed by human organisms via the same mechanisms and physiological 
substrates as other objects.  
Taking the above issues together, this suggests Damasio's analyses offer a new and 
causally based foundation for several key areas of design theory-making across a wide 
range of sub-fields, such as:  
• Design cognition  
• Perception and interaction of users, customers, designers, and other 
constituents with designed objects, systems, services and organisations.  
• User-centred design activities  
• Useability testing  
• Models of design process  
• The establishment of design brief  
• Design management  
• Design collaboration and participation processes  
• Comparative critique of designed outcomes  
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Damasio's work also offers the basis for significant advancement of practical, 
computer emulations of human functioning that replicate the human emotion, feeling 
and consciousness processes in, for example, robotic devices. Reports of approaches 
indicate design research in this area mainly draws on emotion-based theories drawn 
form cognitive science (see, for example, Design and Emotion Society, 2003; The 
Experience of Everyday Things, 2002; Sloman, 2001). Acceptance of Damasio's 
analyses into the design research fields would lead quickly to radical changes in 
theories and their foundations, and to new generations of research instruments and 
methods. For example, one of Damasio's research methods for identifying the 
essential observable metrics of core consciousness used an ongoing behavioural 
music-like 'score' comprising parallel 'performances' in the dimensions of verbal 
report, specific actions, specific emotions, focused attention, low-level attention, 
background emotion and wakefulness. Reworked, this approach suggests potential 
improvements to the protocol methods that have been recently fashionable in 
developing correlation-based models of design activity (see, for example, Cross, 
2000; Galle & Kovács, 1996; Gero & Tang, 2001)  
5. Conclusions  
This paper has outlined some of the key points from Damasio's (1999; 1994) analyses 
about the roles and underlying mechanisms that connect emotion, feeling, 
consciousness and human activity. In doing this the main foci have been how these 
findings relate to planning processes such as designing, the ways people interact with 
designed outcomes, and communication between those involved in design processes.  
The above sketch of Damasio's model of the interrelated emotion, feeling, self-
creating, consciousness processes of necessity provides an overview rather than a 
detailed exposition. In the original, Damasio's analyses, explanations and empiical 
investigations are unusually well validated by the standards of design research. In 
epistemological terms this presents a situation in which a new set of theories 
challenge the foundations of the existing theory base and are simultaneously better 
justified and offer causal rather than correlatory explanation.  
The implication is that it is necessary to review in depth and breadth the foundations 
of design theory as they relate to, or are dependent on, theories of human functioning 
that involve emotion, feelings, reason, cognition, agency, perception, human 
interaction, interaction with objects, consciousness, identity, values and sense of self. 
This would appear to include almost all of theory relating to human design activity.  
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